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BANKRUPTCY-STATE JURISDICTION-TITLE OF TRUSTEE-A purchaser for
value, without notice, of personal property in New Mexico sold under an attachment made but two weeks before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
the owner in Illinois, was held not to have been chargeable with knowledge of
the bankruptcy proceedings without actual notice and hence to have acquired,
as bona fide purchaser, a title good against the bankrupt's trustee. The claim
of the trustee was transferred to the proceeds of the sale. Jones v. Springer,
33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 64 (U. S., 1912).
The jurisdiction of a state court in a pending suit is not, ipso facto, ousted
by the adjudication of the defendant as a bankrupt. The state court cannot
take judicial notice of such adjudication; it must be informed thereof by some
proper pleadings in the case. Eyster v. Gaff, 0i U. S. 521 (1875); Frank v.
If the suit terminates in a judgment against
Vollkommer, 205 U. S. 529 (906).
the bankrupt, rendered and entered after the adjudication or discharge in bankruptcy, the bankrupt cannot plead such odischarge in a suit upon such judgment. Revere Copper Co. v. Dimock, 9 N. Y. 36 (1882); Stevens v. Myers,
72 N. Y. App. 128 (19o2).
Property which has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its
process, is to be considered in the custody of the court. And the general rule
is that no other court can interfere with that possession unless it be an appellate court. Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 343 (U. S., 1865); Shields v. Coleman,
t57 U. S. 168 (1894); Crompton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 263 (1895). Jurisdiction
thus acquired cannot be taken away or arrested by proceedings in another
court. Ex parte Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443 (1896). Even though the property be
that of a bankrupt, unless fraud be shown, Southern Loan Co. v. Benbow,
96 Fed. Rep. 514 (1899), or unless the possession was acquired within
four months of the petition in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act, 1898, § 67; in re
Knight, 125 Fed. Rep. 35 (i9O3). If the action was begun more than four
months before, even though possession was not taken until within four months
of the filing of the petition, the state court is not ousted of its jurisdiction. In
re English, 127 Fed. Rep 940 (19o4); Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165 (1902);
Pickers v. Roy, 187 U. S. 177 (1902). But a court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction summarily to inquire whether the seizure under process from a state court
was upon an actual basis or was morely colorable. In re Weinger Co., 126 Fed.
Rep. 875 (1903)The bankrupt's estate vests by operation of law in the, trustee as of the
date of the adjudication. B. A., 1893, § 70 a, except as to property exempted
by state laws. B. A., 1898, § 6; Lockwood v. Exch. Bank, 190 U. S. 294 (1902).
The trustee's title attaches to the subjects of fraudulent transfers by the bankrupt. Knapp v. Millwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S. 545 (i9o9). But the trustee's
title is subject to all claims, liens, and equities which would have been valid
against it in the hands of the bankrupt. Zartman v. First Nat. Bank, 216 U.
S. 134 (i9o9); Security Co. v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415 (1907). Whether a claim or
lien which antedates the petition by more than four months, is good or void, is
determined by the law of the particular state. Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.
S. 91 (19o5); Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 (19o7); Stickney Coal Co.
v. Goodwin, 95 Me. 246 (i9oi). The trustee does not take as an innocent purchaser for value; title voidable in the bankrupt's hand; is voidable in the trustee's hands. Hewit v. Berlin Works, 194 U. S. 296 (1903).
By § 67, f of B. A., i898, all judgments, attachments and other liens obtained by process of law within four months preceding the filing of the petition
are void, except as to innocent purchasers for value thereunder. One who buys
without knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy proceedings is a bona fide purchaser and will be protected. Jones v. Springer, supra; Eyster v. Gaff, supra.
But otherwise if he purchases with knowledge of the bankruptcy. Brown v. Case,
(332)
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iSo Mass. 45 (I9OI). And one who sells property of a bankrupt under a lien
or attachment, acquired within four months of the petition, is liable for conversion. Jones v. Stevens, 94 Me. 582 (i9o1). And although a state law declares an attaching creditor to be a bona fide purchaser as against third persons,
yet if the attachment proceedings began within four months of the petition,
the attachment is void as against the trustee. In re Kaupisch Co., 107 Fed.
Rep. 93 (1901).
BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE-OFFER To RENEW CONTRACT-An
offer by defendant, to renew and perform the contract of marriage, made after
action is begun on a breach thereof, constitutes no defense to the action; nor
will it be heard in mitigation of damages or as bearing on the amount of damages. Kendall v. Dunn. 76 S. E. Rep. 428 (W. Va., 1912).
The principal case -.
; in accord with the universal rule that a defendant's
offer to marry after breach and suit begun is no defense. Kurtz v. Frank,
76 Ind. 594 (0881); Leefman v. Soloman, 7 Abb. Pr. 409 (N. Y., 1858); Southward v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254 (N. Y., x826). Some jurisdictions, however, allow such an offer to be considered in mitigation of damages. Kelly v. Renfro,
9 Ala. 325 (1846).
Where the defendant bona fide offers to marry plaintiff, although the defendant's conduct previously was such as would justify plaintiff in terminating
the engagement, but plaintiff has not signified an intention to do so, such offer
seems to be a defense. Kelly v. Renfro, 9 Ala. 325 (1846). Where the parties
actually intermarry, the action, of course, abates. Harris v. Tison, 63 Ga.
629 (1879).
According to the principal case, an offer to renew and perform,
if made before suit brought, may go to mitigat& damages.
It seems to be well established that evidence of events occuring after the
beginning of the suit cannot be given in aggravation or mitigation of damages;
and it is on this principle that the decision of the principal case is based. Greenleaf v. McColley, 14 N. H. 303 (1843); Miller v. Hayes, 34 Iowa 496 (1872);
Dent v. Pickens, 34 W. Va. 240 (1890).
CONTEMPT-BY JUDGE OF TRIAL COURT-Upon the reversal of a cause of
action tried before the respondent, he published an article scandalizing the
judicial action of the appellate court, reflecting upon the character of the judges
in their judicial capacity and tending to bring the court, as well as the individual
members, into contempt and ridicule. Itwas held that the respondent was in
contempt and his position as judge of an inferior court not only did not excuse
his offense but in fact greatly aggravated it. In re Fite, 76 S. E. Rep. 397 (Ga.,
1912).
Although cases of contempt are by no means rare, yet one of this character is an exception. However, in Nevada, a district judge in open court, but
not in the proceedings of the case, attacked the review court for its reversal and
was held in contempt. In re Breen, 3o Nev. 164 (i9o8). Also a deputy marshal
was guilty of criminal contempt in writing to his commissioner, "Your post
card at hand. I will have to tell my self-adopted boss, study your official duties and let your warrants come through proper channel."
In re Perkins,
oo Fed. 950 (I9o).
"Any act or conduct on the part of the judges of an inferior court, in disrespect of, or in disobedience of the mandate of a superior court, pending an
appeal thereto is contempt."
Rapalje, Contempt, Sect. 54. But the cases
there cited are cases of civil contempt like refusal to obeya mandamus. Exparte
Carnochan, T. U. P. Charlt. 315 (Ga., I81o).
If the officers of the court can be guilty of criminal contempt as actorneys,
People v. District Court, 8 Pac. Rep. 242 (Col., i9oi); receivers, Clark v. Buringer, 43 Superior 344 (N. Y., 1878), affirmed in 75 N. Y. 344; sheriffs, Rice
v. McClintock, Ind. 354 (S. Car., 1838), there is no reason why the court
itself should be protected, for as was said in the principal case, "No man, no
matter how high his station, is exempt from punishment for crime.'"
For the Pennsylvania and federal statutes limiting the power of courts
over contempt and expressly forbidding summary punishment of newspaper
contempt, see Loyd's "Selected Cases on Civil Procedure," page 177 and citations.
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amount due being unliquidated, the debtor sent a check for a less sum than demanded with the condition upon its face that it was in full payment of all d-mands and if unsatisfactory to be returned ac once. The creditor returned it
as unsatisfactory, but subsequently received another check for the same amount
without the condition, and it was held that this did not amount to accord and
satisfaction. Rose v. American Paper Co., 85 At. Rep. 354 (N. J., 1913).
It is almost universally held that where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, payment and acceptance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and satisfaction. Murphy v. U. S., 104 U. S. 464 (i88I);
Stimpson v. Poole, 141 Mass. 5o2 (1885); Wisner v. Schopp, 34 N. Y., App.
Div. ig (1898); Harlow v. Wilkensburg, 189 Pa. 443 (1899); Wilkinson v.
Byers, i A. and E. zo6 (Eng., x834). However, the offer of the payment of
less sum than claimed must be accompanied by such acts and declarations as
amount to a condition, that if it is accepted it is to be in full satisfaction. Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576 (1888); Deutmann
v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App. 624 (189i); Ostrander v. Scott, 16x Ill. 339 (1896).
The condition that if a tender be accepted it shall be in full satisfaction
of the disputed claim may be expressed in the check itself, Kerr v. Sanders, 122
N. C. 635 (1898); or in the letter or account, Whitaker v. Eilenberg, 70 N. Y.
App. Div. 489 (1902); or receipt accompanying the remittance, Nassoiy v.
Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326 (1896); or even orally in conversation, Co!e v. Champlain Trans. Co., 26 Vt. 87 (1853).

Where the tender or offer is thus made, the party to whom it is made has
no alternative but to refuse it or accept it upon such condition. Bull v. Bull,
43 Conn. 455 (1876); Deutmann v. Kilpatrick, supra.
The principal case is in accord with the decided weight of authority that
where the debtor sends a check, stating it to be in full and asking that it be returned if not satisfactory, and the creditor retains it, there is an accord and
satisfaction. Hutter v. Stoddard, 83 Ind. 539 (x882); Freiberg v. Moffet, 91
In the prinHun. 17 (N. Y., 1895); Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231 (893).
cipal case there was no such retention.
CONTRACTS-AGENCY-SUNDAY LAw-In Krzyminski v. Callahan, 1oo N.
E. Rep. 335 (Mass., 1913), it was held that the appointment on Sunday, by a
principal, of an agent to sign in his behalf a contract for the sale of real estate,
is a transaction of secular business and is void; and, without other authority,
the agent may not make a binding contract for his principal. The decision
follows the rule laid down in Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H 500 (1838); Saltmarsh
v. TuthilL 13 Ala. 405 (1848); Davis v. Barger, 57 Ind. 54 (1877).
At common law, contracts entered into on Sunday were as valid as those
made on any other day. Drury v. Defontaine, i Taunt. 131 (18o8); Shuman
v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 9o (1856). The doctrine that contracts made on Sunday
re void depends, ther, fore, entirely on statutory enactment. Hence, a contract made on Sunday in violation of a statute, is an illegal contract and void
between the parties. Davis v. B -rger, sup-a; Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299
(1884); Bank v. Kingsley, 84 Me. tit (I$9I).
The doctrine of the principal case seems to be in accord with the rule already laid down in Massachusetts, thIt a contract, not of necessity or charity,
is void if made on the Lord's day between sunrise and sunset. Pattee v. Greely,
c.4 Mass. 284 (1847); Merriam v. Stearns, 64 MIss. 257 (1852). And it is also
the rule generally adopted. Benlross v. State, 5 Ga. App. 175 (i9o8); Riddle
v. Keller, 61 N. J. Eq. 513 (i9Ol); Lee v. Drake, io Pa. Co. t. 276. However,
an instrument requiring delivery is not void because signed on Sunday. Harris
v. Morse, 49 Me. 432 (1862); Beiteman's. Appeal, 55 Pa. 183 (067); Hall v.
Parker, 37 Mich. 59o (1877); Gibbs Mfg. Co. v. BruckLr, iii U. S. 597 (x884).
The mere carrying on of negotiations on Sunday, hewever, will not invalidate
a contract completed on a secular day. The final consummation of the contract on Sunday is necessary to bring it within the prohibition of the Sunday
statute. King v. Fleming, 72 I1. 21 (1874); Tyler v. Waddingham, 58 Conn.
375 (189o); Hurr v. Nivinson 69 At. 1094 (N. J., 19G8); Shepley v. Siegil Co..

203 Mass. 43 (i9o9).
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A. to what is necessary work within the Sunday statutes, see 6o Univ. of
Penna. Law Review, 522.
CORPORATIONS-BoNus DIVIDEND--CAPITAL OR INcoME-A company,
wishing to capitalize a large reserve fund, offered to its shareholders £io. per
share as a bonus dividend, or another share of stock fully paid up. The value
of the latter was about £3o. Trustees by will, holding in trust two hundred
shares of the stock, chose to accept the shares rather than the cash bonus. On
the question arising as to whether the shares were capital or income, the court
bupported the trustees in holding the shares to be capital, since the company,
with the evident intention to capitalize the reserve fund, had made the taking
of the shares of so much greater advantage than accepting the cash bonus, that
the shareholders were precluded from making a free choice, and shares so accepted represented capital.
The old English doctrine would seem to make all bonus dividends capital.
Paris v. Paris, io Ves. 185 (1804), whether the distribution was of money or of
stock. The leading modern case is Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385 (1887),
with facts closely similar to the principal case. The test there laid down was
that the whole question hinged on the intendment of the company when making
the distribution. If the company declared a bonus dividend and offered new
stock at the same time to the shareholders, with no intention to capitalize the
surplus dividend declared, this dividend would be the property of the life cenant, but where the offer is so arranged that it is evident from the whole transaction that the shareholder will accept the shares in lieu of the cash bonus and the
evident intent is to capitalize this accumulation of profits, or floating capital,
then the dividend is capital, not income. In the former case, if the trustee
accepts the shares, he should sell them, turn over the cash dividend offered and
retain the surplus as capital. In re Malam, (1898) 3 Ch. 528. In Bouch v.
Sproule, supra,the allotment of stock was held capital and went to the remainderman. Cf. in r: Northage, (189I) 60 L. J. 488, where the allotment of stockwas
income, because there was no intent to increase the capitalization of the company. For a discussion of the American cases, see University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Vol. 60, page I3O (1911-1912), and Vol. 6I, page 48 (1912-1913).
CORPORArto-.s-DmEcToRs-ISPECTION OF BooKs-In Macken v. Elect ical Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212 (1912), it was held that a director has the unqualified right to inspect the boks of the corporation, and all he need show to have
a writ of mandamus issue to compel the officer of such corporation to allow him
to make an inspection, is that he is a director of the company, that he has demanded permission to examine, and that his demand has been refused.
This case follows People v. Central Fish Co., 117 N. Y. App. Div. 77 (19o7).
which holds that directors and administrative officers have an absolute right to
inspect the books without regard to motive, and it is in accord with the few
cases which have been decided upon this subject. Stone v. Kellogg, 62 I11.
App. 444 (1895); People ex rel. v. Columbia Paper Bag Co., 103 N. Y. App.
Div. 208 (1905). In Stone v. Kellogg, supra, it was held that the majority of
the board cannot lawfully exclude a minority from the right.
In Pennsylvania, the right of a stockholder to inspect has been sustained
in face of the averment of a bt lief that the demand for inspection was not in
good faith, but for the purpose of using the information as a director in a competing company. Kuhback v. Cut Glass Co., 220 Pa. 427 (1908). In other
states, the common law right of a stockholder to inspect all the books and
records of the corporation at proper and reasonable times has been sustained.
People v. Mott, i Howard Prac. 247 (N. Y., 1845); Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt.
519 (1881); Huyler v. Cragin Cattle Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 392 (1885); Richardson
v. Swift, 7 Houston 137 (Del., 1885); State ex. rd. English v. Lazarus, 127
Mo. App. 401 (1907); Andrews v. Mines Corporation, 205 Mass. 121 (IO).
In most states, as well as in England, the right of a stockholder to inspect
the books of a corporation, has been secured by statute3 and by constitutional
provisions. Com. v. Phila. and R. R. Co., 3 Pa. Dist. 115 (t894); Bowidette
v. Gaslight Co., 49 La. Ann. 1556 (897).
The right to inspect the books in.cludes the right to make the inspection by agent, solicitor, counsel or expert.
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Blair v. Massey, I. Rep. 5 Eq. 623 (1871); Ellsworth v. Dorwart, 95 Iowa xo8
(1895); Foster v. White, 86 Ala. 467 (1888); Blymyer v. Iron Works Co., 5 Ohio
N. P. 71 (1'898); State v. Citizens' Bank, 51 La. Ann. 426 (1899).
CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-UNAUTHORIZED

DISCHARGE OF

JURY-In Parker

v. State, 59 Southern Rep. 319 (Ala., 1912) the defendants were under indictment for manslaughter. The jury were given the case at about six o'clock in
the evening; at ten, they summoned the sheriff, announced that they had reached
a conclusion, and gave him a piece of paper on which their verdict was written.
The sheriff went in search of the judge, but finding him asleep, returned and
discharged the jury. They were assembled the next morning an hour before
the opening of court, but did not consider or deliberate upon their verdict, believing that their work had been fully completed. The foreman handed the
verdict of the night before to the clerk when court convened, whereupon the
defendants objected and filed a motion to that effect; the court accepted the
verdict, and, over the objection of the defendants, discharged the jury. On appeal it was held that the verdict having been delivered to the sheriff during a
recess of court when neither the judge nor defendants were present, and not having been subsequently adopted or ratified by the jury, was a nullity. Therefore.
since the jury had been sworn, the trial entered upon, and the jury discharged
without warrant of law over the defendant's objection, said defendants should
be discharged from further prosecution under the indictment.
The decision of the court that a discharge of the jury after rendering a void
verdict amounts to an acquittal, the prisoner thus having been once in jeopardy, seems to be sustained by the weight of authority in this country. Jackson v. State, 102 Ala. 76 (1893); Hayes v. State, 107 Ala. 1 (1894); People v.
Small, I Cal. App. 320 (19o5); Schreiber v. Clapp, 13 OkI. 215 (1903); State v.
Costello, 29 Wash. 366 (1902); King v. People, 5 Hun. 297 (N. Y., 1875); McCauley v. State, 26 Ala. 135 (1855); People v. Jones, 48 Mich. 554 (1882); Clark
on Criminal Procedure, Chap. II, page 39r.
The defendant must object to the verdict before the discharge of the jury;
he cannot acquiesce in the verdict and then claim the benefit of a defect. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. I I I (1817); People v. Kern, 8 Utah 268 (1892);
Wilson v. State, 20 Ohio 26 (1870); Kengen v. State, 46 Ind. 132 (1874).
EASEMENT-CIIARA-TCR

AND EXTENT-PAROL

EVIDENCE-The character

and extent of an easement are to be determined from the language of the deed;
and if that is ambiguous, the situation of the property and the surrounding
circumstances may be -everted to, in order to ascertain the intention of parties,
and give it effect. L aOh v. White, et, . 84 Atl. Rep. 326 (Conn., 1912). This
case affirms a ruie which has been quite fully litigated in its jurisdiction. Strong
v. Benedict, 5 Conn, 2io (z824); Brown v. Slater, 16 Conn. 195 (x844); Sweeney
v. Landers, et a. 8o Conn. 575 (i9o8); Peck v. Mackowsky, 85 Conn. 190 (1912);
and is in accord with the widely adopted principle that parol evidence is admissable to explain a latent ambiguity in a deed. Senger v. Senger, 81 Va.,
687 (x886); Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586 (1886); Linney v. Wood, 66 rex.
22 (1886).
This is to show the intent at the time of the grant. Alderman of
Chesterfield's Case, Cro. Eliz 35 (1790); Goughe v. Howarde, 3 Bulst. 125
(1688); Vaterpark v. Finnell, 7 H. L. C. 65o (1859); Morrison v. Marquardt,
24 Ia. 64 (1867); Collins v. Driscoll, 34 Conn. 43 (x867); Noyes v. Hemphill,
58 N. H. 538 (1879). That intent is the determining element. Bradley v.
Boom Co., 82 Mich. 9 (189o); Jones on Easements, § 87, 88, and 89; Gale on
Easements, pp. 78-80. But, contra, Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn.
397 (895), ruling that the grant of an easement must contain a sufficient description of the land which is to be subjected to the servitude.
EMINENT DOMAIN-NECEssITY-DETERMINATiON-When
the legislature
has authorized a public or private corporation, or individuals, to condemn such
property as may be necessary for a defined public purpose, without designating
the particular property, the right of decision is vested, primarily at least, in the
party to whom is given the power to condemn; and the question of necessity
is not open to judicial review, unless so provided in the enabling grant, except
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in cases of bad faith, oppression, or unreasonable conduct. Board of Water
Comm'rs. of City of Norwich v. Johnson, et al., 84 AtI. Rep. 727 (Conn., 1912).
This decition carries out numerous earlier Connecticut decisions, Todd v. Austin,
34 Conn. 78 (1867); N. Y. etc. R. R. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424 (1897). It aligns
itself with the wcight of American authorities, declaring that the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, is a function purely legislative or political, not subject
to judicial review. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878); Lynch v.
Forbes, 16i Mass. 302 (1894); Hayford v. Bangor, 102 M.. 340 (19o7); Chicago,
etc. R. Co. v. Pontiac, 169 Ill. 155 (1907); Biddle v. Waterworks Co., i9o Pa.
94 (1899); Rome v. Waterworks Co., loo N. Y. Suppl. 357 (19o6). And, of
course, being prima facie conclusive, it stands good until impeached, without
waiting for judicial affirmation. City of Philadelphia v. Ward, 174 Pa. 45 (1896);
re City of Buffalo, 15 N. Y. Suppl. 123 (189i); Deitrichs v. R. R., 13 Nebr. 361
(1882); Southern Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1(903); Warner v. Gunnison,
2 Colo. App. 430 (1892); Simpson v. City of K. C., iii Mo. 237 (1892); Santa
Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538 (893).
A determination under such power is impeachable only in case the power
87 (1894); Bass v. Ft.
has been abu*ed. Tidens v. Sanitary Dist., 149 I11.
Wayne, 121 Ind. 389 (1889); Hayford v. Bangor, supra.; Lynch v. Forbes,
supra.; City of Phila. v. Ward, supra. Or if there has been bad faith or oppression. Fall River Iron Co. v. R. R., 87 Mass. 221 (1862); Cotton v. Boom Co.,
22 Minn. 372 (1876); Douglas v. Byrnes, 57 Fed. 29 (1876).
The limited number of decisions contra, of which Stearns v. Barre, 73 Vt.
281 (i9oi); Reed v. Louisville Bridge Co., 8 Bush. 69 (Ky. 1871); and Tracy
v. R. R., 80 Ky. 259 (1882), are strongest, leave unanswered, as the principal
case points out, the objection that the court, in imposing the requirement of
judicial approval upon the determination of necessity, is encroaching upon the
inherently legislative and essentially political power of determining, or delegating to the condemnor to determine, what is the necessity.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE-RENTS

AND

PROFITs-In a contract of

sale of a piece of land, the purchaser agreed to release the vendor's property from
a mortgage debt of $5,ooo, and pay$ iooo in cash; the vendor delayed to convey,
and the purchaser filed a bill for specific performance. Before being entitled to
a conveyance, he was required to file a release of the mortgage, paying principal
and interest, and to deposit $i,ooo in cash, a deposit of $6,ooo not being deemed
equivalent. He was not deemed entitled to rents, and profits. Bateman v.
Hopkins, 76 S.E. Rep. 253 (N. C., x912).
The decree would seem contra to the weight of authority. It is the unquestioned rule that where a conveyance of land is ordered on a contract of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to the rents, issues and profits, the seller to interest on the
purchase money, unless he has appropriated it to the use of the vendor. Eastman v. Simpson, 139 Mass. 348 (1865); Bostick v. Beach, 105 N. Y. 66I (1887).
In this way equity endeavors to give such a remedy as will leave the parties in a
situation as nearly possible like that which would exist if the agreement had been
carried out. So when a vendor has delayed in making a conveyance and an
assessment has been charged agaiust the property, equity will not consider such
an assessment as an encumbrance on the title, in carrying out the contract of
sale. Regette v. Timmer, 98 N. Y. App. 619 (1904). If the vendee is in possession, he is of course enjoying the rents and profits of the land, and equity decrees only interest on the purchase money to the vendor. In Davis v. Parker,
14 Allen 94 (Mass., z867), the land involved was timber land; the vendor was
not allowed to take the interest of the purchase on the ground that the vendee
had the profit of one year's growth. There is another rule that when the contract leaves the amount of the purchase money to be ascertained, notwithstanding
a stipulation that the interest is to run from the date of the contract, equity will
not grant the interest to the vendor, except from the time when the amount had
been ascertained exactly. Calting v. Great Northern Ry. Co., x8 IV. R. 21;
21 L. T. N. S. 17 (1869).
EV1DF!CE-' HOTOGRAPHS AND PIcTU'Es-In Cincinnati R. Co. v. DeOnzo,
oo N. E. Rep. .20 (Ohio, 19z2), it was hel' that photographs are admissible
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in evidence when they appear to have been accurately taken, and are proved to
be correct representations of a subject in controversy, which subject cannot itself be produced, or of some subject incident to it, and also of such a nature as to
throw light upon the disputed point. As it was also necessary for the plaintiff to
prove his ability, prior to the accident, to perform certain difficult feats of personal agility and skill, and he had given oral testimony tending to describe such
feats, it was not error to admit in evidence magazine pictures which are proved
to represent the facts correctly, and calculated to enable the jury more clearly
to understand and apply the oral evidence.
This is in accord with the general rule that whenever it is relevant or important to describe a person, place or thing, in either a civil or criminal case, photographs or pictures are admissible for the purpose of explaining and applying the
evidence in a cause and assisting the court or jury in understanding the case.
Com. v. Connors, 156 Pa. 147 (1893); Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613 (1895);
People v. Pustolka, 149 N. Y. 570 (1896); State v. Hersom, 9 Me. 273 (1897);
Com. v. Best, 18o Mass. 492 (1902); State v. Cook, 75 Conn. 267 (1902).
Photographs which do not throw light upon any controverted point are not
material and should be excluded. In re Jessup, 8i Cal. 408 (1889); People v.
Webster, 134 N. Y. 73 (1893). They must be shown by extrinsic evidence to
be a true and faithful representation of the place or subject as it existed at the
time involved. Chicago v. Vesey, io5 Ill. App. 1I1 (1902); Goldsboro v. N. J.
Cent. R. Co., 6o N. J. L. 49 (1897); Beardslee v. Columbia T'p., 188 Pa. 496
(1898). The foundation for their introduction may be laid by any one who
testifies to their correctness as representations or likenesses. McGar v. Bristol,
71 Conn. 652 (1899); Steasny v. Metropolitan R. C., 172 N. Y. 656 (igoi);
Mow v. People, 31 Col. 351 (19o3).
It is a preliminary question to be determined by the presiding judge whether
a photograph is sufficiently verified. Carey v. Hubbardston, 172 Mass. IO6 (188);
Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345 (1899); Chicago v. Vesey, supra; or whether it is
practically instructive; Pritchard v. Austin, 69 N. H. 367 (1898); Dolan v.
Mutual Assoc., 173 Mass. 197 (1899).
In an
CAUSE OF INJURYINSURANcE-AccIDENT POLICY -PROXIMATE
action on an accident policy which provided for recovery where injury or
death was caused "directly and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental and violent means," it was held that when at time of the accident there was an existing disease, which, co-operating with the accident, resulted
in the injury or death, the accident cannot be considered as the sole cause or the
cause independent of all other causes. Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 76 S. E.
Rep. 262 (N. C., 1912).

This case raises the question of proximate cause and presents the usual
difficulty of practically applying the simple rule that the company is liable when
the accident is the proximate cause of the result. In accident insurance, however, proximate cause has a somewhat unusual relation to liability, as liability is
fixed by the contract of insurance, and the question to be determined is, "does
this contract cover this condition of affairs?" Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Melick, 65
Fed. 178 (1894). In Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351 (1892),
a fall which brought on a renewed attack of peritonitis, causing death, was held
to be the proximate cause. So also in Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174
MO. 256 (1903), in which case a fall ruptured a kidney, claimed to beal ready
cancerous. These two cases and others cited therein have often been supposed
to lay down a rule in conflict with the rule of the principal case, but they were
explained by the court in the principle case on the ground that the question was
left to the jury as to whether there was a pre-existing disease co-operating with
the accident and that, under the charge of the court, the jury must necessarily
have found that, even if there were a pre-existing disease, it did not co-operate
with the accident, and hence allowed recovery. The true doctrine is not that
the mere existence of a previous malady at the time of the accident would defeat recovery, if, by itself, it would ultimately have produced the injury, although
it did not co-operate with the accident in causing it, but that if the two, accident
and disease, acting together, were the producing causes of it, the plaintiff could
not recover. Ward v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 85 Neb. 471 (19o9); N. A. Casualty Co
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v. Shields, x55 Fed. 54 (1907); Cary v. P. A. Ins. Co., 127 Vis. 67 (t9o6); White
v. S. L. & Acc. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77 (1905).
Where disease was contracted from handling rags recovery was allowed,
Columbia Paper Co. v Fed. Co., 1o4 Mo. App. 157 (1904); so also where a hostler
contracted glanders from a diseased horse, H. P. Hood & Sons v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 92 N. E. 329 (Mass., i9io); but contra, recovery was denied where
anthrax was contracted from handling hides. Bacon v. U. S. Mut. Co., 123 N.
Y. 304 (i89o). A wound p.roduced by an accident, which causes one to fall into
the water and drown, inako.!s a case of accidental death. Mallory v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 72 (1871); so death caused by choking on food, American Acc.
Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547 (1893); and death from asphyxia occasioned by deadly
gas in a shallow well, into which one descends to fix a pump. Pickett v. Pac.
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79 (1981).
JUDGEs-DISQUALIFICATION.-NECESSITY-In State v. Pollty, 138 N. W.
Rep. 3o (S. D., 1912), the Supreme Court of South Dakota was applied to for a
writ of prohibition in an election controversy involving the terms of office of
four of the five members of the court. In spite of the interest of the judges, it
was decided they must be qualified to entertain the application, as there was no
provision for substitutes for judges of the Supreme Court who might be disqualified, and a refusal to hear it would leave the relator without remedy.
Early decisions at common law held that any interest by the judge in the
controversy would disqualify his sitting in the case regardless of the necessity
of the occasion. Anon., i Salk. 395 (i698); Case of Faxham Tithing, 2 Salk.
6o6 (704); Mayor of London v. Markwich, ii Mod. 164 (1709). But the
stringency of this rule was soon relaxed, for in The Matter of the Parishes of
Great Charte and Kennington, 2 Strange 1173 (1743), it was said, that as to the
case of public corporations, if it appeared that there were no other justices, a
party interested might be a judge, to prevent a failure of justice. The English
courts have adhered to this principle with little or no exception. Dimes v.
Grand Junction Canal, 3 H. L. C. 758, io Eng. Rep. 301 (1852); Wellusson v.
Rendelsham, 7 H. C. C. 429, x Eng. Rep. 72 (869).
In both these cases it was
evident that the parties would have been without remedy had the original idea of
disqualification for interest prevailed.
In this country the tendency of the courts has always been to recognize
this rule of necessity. Comm. v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 89 (18o9); 13 Me. 324 (1816);
Petition of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39 (N Y., 1846); Ten Eich v. Simpson, i i Paige 177
(N. Y., 1844); Phila. v. Fox, 64 Pa., 170 (870); Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y. I
(1878); Heydenfeldt v. Touns, 27 Ala. 423 (1855); State v. Houser, 122 Wis. 534
(1904).
It cannot be doubted that the circumstances in the principal case were
sufficient to bar a judge from sitting under the general doctrine of what constitutes
interest. State v. Wright, 37 Ohio. St. 153 (x881); Augusta Southern R. R. v.
McDade, xo5 Ga. 134 (1898); Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847 (1766); Williams v. Robinson, 6o Mass. 335 (185o); ex pare Cornwell, 144 Ala. 497 (1905);
Graley v. Board of Commissioners, 174 Md. 181 (I9xo).
jUDOMENTs-AMEND51ENTS AFTER TERm-When a written judgment fails
to incorporate the true sentence or judgment of the court through a mistake of
the court, upon motion after the term the judgment may be set aside and the true
judgment entered nunc pro tunc. But the facts found by the trial court are not
reviewable by the appellate court. Creed ef al. v. Marshall ef al., 76 S. E. Rep.
270 (N. Car., 1912).
The rule that the record admits no alteration after the term is obsolete.
Freeman on Judgments, sec. 71; and this power exists in criminal as well as civil
cases. Ex parte Jones, 61 Ala. 399 (1878).
The principal case sums up the three general rules as to amendments after
term: i. Where a judgment has been actually rendered, but not entered on the
record on account of an accident or mistake or neglect of the clerk, upon motion
after the term the court will order its entry nunc pro tunc if its rendition is established and no intervening rights are prejudiced. Accord: Oberndorfer v.
Moyer, 84 Pac. Rep. 1102 (Utah, 19o6).
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2. But a motion made after term to amend a judgment will not be granted
where the purpose is to enter a judgment which the court failed to render at the
proper time or to change the judgment actually rendered to one which was not
rendered. Accord: Pursley v. Wickle, 4 Ind. App. 383 (891).
3. Between these two extremes is the principal case. However, there is a
difference as to what can authorize an amendment. The English rule is that the
amendment must be authorized by some matter of record. Doe v. Perkins, 3
T. R. 749 (1790). Following the English rule are: Makepicce v. Luken, 27
Md. 435 (t867); De Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 49 (1864); Giddings v. Giddings, 70 Iowa 486.
Other states have followed the more liberal view and allow parol evidence.
Matheson's Adms. v. Grant's Adms., 2 How. 263 (U. S., 1844); Rugger v. Parker,
7 Gray 172 (Mass., x856); Farquer -t. Farquer, 19 Il. 68 (1857); Hollister v.
Judges, 8 Ohio 201 (1857); Creed v. Marshall, supra.
The practice in these states is to present a petition and motion embodying
the defect alleged and the proposed correction. Notice is given to the adverse
party and he is given a chance to contest. Weed v. Weed, 25 Conn. 337 (z856).

MALICIOUS

PROSECUTION-ABUSE

OF

ATTACHMENT

PROCESS-WHEN

AcTioN ARisEs-Where an action was started by attachment proceedings and
defendant brings suit for malicious prosecution, it was held that even though there
was no malicious suing out of the attachment yet if there was an abuse of the
process the action is maintainable and in such case, contrary to the general rule,
the action arises immediately upon the abuse and need not await the termination of the suit complained of. Wright v. Harris, 76 S. E. Rep. (N. C., 1912).
An action for malicious prosecution is maintainable for an action, civil or
criminal, brought with a design to do mischief, or with a reckless disregard of
the rights of others, or an intent to do an injury to another, or in the absence of
legal excuse, or any other motive than that of bringing a party to justice. Shannon v. Jones, 76 Tex. 141 (i89o); and it is maintainable for the prosecution of a
civil suit, without probable cause, even though there was no interference with the
person or property of the defendant. Whipple v. Fuller, ii Conn. 582 (1836);
Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209 (1869); Eastin v. Bank, 66 Cal. 123 (1884); Allen
v. Codman, 139 Mass. 136 (x885).
An action may be maintained for the malicious prosecution of an action of
replevin, although the defendant in the replevin suit recovered the damages
suffered from the taking and detention of his goods. McPherson v. Runyon,
41 Minn. 524 (1889).
It is not material whether the malicious suit was commenced by process of attachment or by summons only. Closson v. Staples,
supra; McNamce v. Minke, 49 Md. 122 (1878); Woods v. Finnell, 13 Bush. 633
(Ky.. 1878).
The malice shown need not be actual, but may be legal, i. e., a wrongful
act done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. Peck v. Chouteau,
91 Alo. 138 (1886); Carothers v. McIllheny, 63 Tex. x38 (1885); Pullen v. Glidden, 66 Me. 202 (1877); Spear v. Hiles, 67 Wis. 350 (1886). Or a purpose no' in
itself unlawful, but pursued by unlawful means. Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 6o 3
(1875); Schmidt v. Weidman, 63 Pa. 173 (1869). And it is always an inference
from facts and circumstances judicially ascertained. Berckner v. CoM., 14
Bush 601 (Ky., 1879); Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App., 165 (1878). A malicious
motive must be proved by the acts, declarations or general conduct of the defendant. Walker v. Pittman, Io8 Ind. 341 (1886). But it may be inferred from
a prosecution without probable causL Bauer v. Clay, 8 Kan. 580 (187); Mowry
v. Whipple, 8 R. '. 360 (1866).
In accord with the principle case, it has been held that when the process of
law has been abused and prostituted to an jllegal purpose, it is perfectly imterial whether or no. it is issued for a just cause of action, or whether the suit was
legally terminated or not. Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212 (Eng., x838);
Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. 283 (187o.
NEGLIGENCE-CROSSING ACCIDENT-DUTY To STop--By the law of New
Jersey the driver of a horse-drawn vehicle is not, as a matter of law, charged
with contributory negligence for failure to stop before crossing the track of a
steam railroad. Penna. R. Co. v. Cash, 2oo Fed. 337 (1913).
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It is general law that it is the duty of travelers about to cross a railroad track
to look and listen, to discover approaching trains. The duty is to make all
reasonable efforts to that end by the use of sight and hearing. Whether the
failure to make such efforts is negligence or not is generally a question for the
jury. Metcalf v. Central Vermont R. Co., 78 Conn. 614 (19o6); Terre Haute,
etc., R. Co. v. Voelker, 129 II!. 540 (1889); Funston v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.,
61 Iowa, 452 (1883); Danskin v. Penna. R. Co., 83 At. Rep. ioo6 (N. J., 1912).
this case being the basis of the decision in the principal case. In some cases it
may be a question for the court. Bannister v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., 113
Mich. 530 (1897); Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gertsen, 15 Il1. App. 614 (1884);
Havens v. Erie Ry. Co., 41 N. Y. 296 (1869).
If one's view of the train is obstructed, he is under the duty of exercising
greater care in listening for the train, and vice versa. Weller v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co., 120 Mo. 635 (1893); Shatta v. Erie R. Co., 121 Fed. 678 (i9o3); Salter
v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 75 N. Y. 273, 281 (1878); Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Barber,
15 Ill. App. 63o (1884).
By the great weight of authority there is no duty to stop before crossing the
railroad; the duty to stop arises only where circumstances render it difficult to
see and hear approaching trains, e. g., fog, darkness, noise of wagon, etc. Malott
v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 127, 134 (1902); Schwanenfeldt v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.,
So Neb. 790, 796 (19o8); Lewis v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N. Y. 52, 63 (1900);
Chase v. Maine R. Co., 78 Me. 346 (1886); H. T. C. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 6o Texas,
142 (1883); Manly v. Delaware, etc., Co., 69 Vt. 101 (1896). In Alabama and
Pennsylvania the duty, before crossing tracks, is to stop as well as look and listen
and the failure to do so is negligence, per se. .Georgia Cent. R. C3. v. Barnett,
x5i Ala. 407 (1907); Ihrig v. Erie R. Co., 210 Pa. 98 (1904). A distinction, however, has been made in Pennsylvania, viz., that after going upon the tracks a
failure to perform that duty may or may not be negligence according to the circumstances. Cohen v. Phila., etc., R. Co., 211 Pa. 227 (1905). If necessary,
the driver is bound to get out of his vehicle in order to look for trains. Mankewicz v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 214 Pa. 386 (19o6). A "bicycler's stop," made
by circling, is not a stop within the meaning of the "stop, look and listen'" rule.
Robertson v. Penna. R. Co., I8O Pa. 43 (1897). The rule is applicable to a fire
engine on its way to a fire. Thompson v. Penna. R. Co., 215 Pa. 113 (I906).
It is to be noted that none of the foregoing cases apply to motor vehicles,
and in New Jersey as to such vehicles the rule of "stop, look and listen" applies.
Brommer v. Penna. R. Co., 179 Fed. 577 (I91O).
PROBATE-WNILLS-Two PERSONS DYING TOGETHER-FoRM OF ADMINISTRATOR'S OATH-The oath of the applicant for letters of administration must
contain a statement of whether or not the decedent had ever married, and if so,
whether there was a survivor of the marriage. A new rule of practice in English
Probate Courts is laid down in the Estate of Roby, L. R. (1913) 1 Probate 6
(1912), with regard to cases commorientes, where there is no evidence, or where
it is clear there is not sufficient evidence of survivorship, in cases of husband and
wife dying together, viz., that in the future application will be made in the Principal Probate Registry, and not, as heretofore, by motion to the court, for grants
of probate or administration, and for leave to vary the usual form of oath. Where
however, there is any doubt as to survivorship, the registrar will refer the case
to the court to be dealt with on motion.
The former rule was derived from the directions of the court in the Goods of
Ewart, I Sw. & Tr. 258 (Probate, 1859), where leave was granted to vary the
oath of probate, so that it might state that the deceased and his wife perished at
the time named, or that, after making inquiries, the applicant for letters of administration had no reason to believe the wife survived the husband; and in the
Gcods of FReynon, L. R. i9oi Prob. Div. 141 (i9oi), upon cross motions by the
next of kin of the husband and of the wife, leave was granted to vary the form of
their respective oaths.
The new rule dispenses with the delay and expense incident to motions.
QUASI CONTRACTS-RECOVERY OF MONEY IN ILLEGAL CONTRACTS-In
Sykes v. Thompson, 76 S. E. Rep. 252 (N. C., i912) it was held that money paid
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on demand, and on threat of prosecuting the payer's sons for a criminal offense,
could be recovered. It turned out that the charge was without foundation and
recovery was allowed because of the defendant's fraud.
Ordinarily, money paid to compound a felony or to suppress a prosecution for
the commission of a misdemeanor is not recoverable. The former is, of course, a
criminal offense in itself, while the latter is. or was, when the distinction first arose,
not, since it did not deprive the crown of the forfeited chattels and land, which
escheated only in case of a felony, or of treason. It would seem, however, that
today when the distinction between a felony and misdemeanor is one of degree,
the courts would, and do, look with very great disapproval on an unofficial
quashing of a prosecution for either for private ends. Fivaz v. Nichols, 2 C. B.
500 (Eng., 1846); Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233 (1892).
Where there is, in addition to this common delict arising from the suppression of the charge, fraud or duress on the part of the defendant, the courts are
growing more and more favorable towards a recovery. This is on the theory
that, although the parties are in delicto, they are not in pari delicto, and that the
party in less odium should be permitted to recover the money paid. Examples
of this type of cases are thc shell game, the fraudulent lottery, and the "fixed"
race. Webb v. Tulchin, 25 N. C. 485 (1843); Cates v. Phalen, 2 Howard 376
(U. S., 1844); and see in this respect the interesting case, Hobbs v. Boatright.
195 Mo. 693 (19o6). The case summarized in the first paragraph bases its decision on this theory, that added to the original delict of both was the fraud and
duress on the part of the defendant
It does not appear in that case whether the offense fraudulently charged was
a felony or a misdemeanor. It was obtaining goods under false pretenses; and
under the Code of i9o5 of North Carolina, § 3431, 3432, 3434, false pretense
may be either, according to the method used. The court fails to note any distinction between suppression of a felony or of a misdemeanor, and apparently
the courts, very generally, base their decision not on the character of the offense
charged, but on the method of charging it. If there is any fraud or duress present, recovery or restitution is invariably allowed. Particularly cogent is the
equity of duress, for that relieves'the plaintiff from the stigma of his delict.
Adams v. Irving, Nat'l Bank II6 N. Y. 6o6 (1889); Williams v. Bayley, I Eng.
& Irish App. Cases 200 (1866); Keener, Quasi Contracts, p. 18i.
In one very
well considered case, a deed was set aside because of fraud and duress, where
the offefice alleged was grand larceny, a felony. Gorrenge v. Reed, 23 Utah
135 (19oo); accord, Burtan :. McMillan, 52 Fla. 469 (907).
Where, how-wer,
there is no duress or fraud and the deed is voluntary and is given as a restitution
of money embezzled, equity will not set it aside. Smith v. Rowley, 22 Barb.
502 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1873). Nor can money paid under similar circumstances
be recovered. Haynes v. Rudd, 83 N. Y. 251 (188o); Packett v. Roquemore,
5s Ga. 235 (1875). In the former of these two cases, the court expressly points
out that there was no fraud or duress present.
QUASI CoNTRAcT-REcoERY OF MONEY PAID ny MIsTAKE-In Baylis
v. Bishop of London, L. R. 1913, I Ch. Div. 127, trustees of an estate, through
mistake of fact, continued paying tithe rent-charges on leasehold property after
the lease had expired, and it was held that the payments could be recovered
back although the Bishop had turned the money over to the bankrupt estate of
the rector of the parish; the court refused to regard the Bishop as having acted
in a representative capacity.
A payment which the party is not by law required to make, made under
ignorance of the facts or in misapprehension in regard thereto, may be recovered
back. Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 234 (1881);
McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579 (1896); Haralson County v. Golden, 104 Ga.
19 (1894); Truax v. Bliss, 139 Mich. 153 (19o5); Egan v. Abbett, 74 N. J. L.
49 (i9o6); Hathaway v. County of Delaware, i85 N. Y. 368 (i9o6); Devine v.
Edwards, ioi Ill. 138 (1881); Stotesbury v. Fordice, 142 Ind. 490 (1895).
By the great weight of authority a payment, made under a mistake of law
with a full understanding of the facts, cannot be recovered. Brisbane v. Dacres,
5 Taunton 143 (1813); Real Estate Say. Inst. v. Linder, 74 Pa. 371 (1873).
Contra, McMurty v. Ky. Cent. R. Co., 84 Ky. 462 (1884); Mansfield v. Lynch,
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59 Conn. 320 (1890). Mistake as to the law of a foreign country or a sister
state is regarded as a mistake of fact, since one is not presumed to know such
law. Haven v. Foster, 26 Mass. 1i2 (1829); Norton v. Marden, 15 Me. 45
(1838).
The theory on which the action is sustained is that the defendant has received something which in good conscience he ought not to retain, rather than
because the plaintiff has parted with something by mistake; e. g. if a debtor
by mistake pays one creditor instead of another, the payment cannot be recovered since the recipient is motally entitled to retain it. Platt v. Bromage, 24
L. J. Exch. 63 (1864); Pensacola, etc., R. Co. v. Braxton, 34 Fla. 471, 479 (I894);
Krumbhaar v. Gewdall, 153 Pa. 476 (1893).
It is generally held that where the money was pa'd to a person known to
be an agent for a principal, the agent cannot be sued, if, before he had notice
of the mistake, he paid the money over to his principal. Buller v. Harrison,
Cowper 565 (i777); Moors v. Bird, 19o Mass. 400 (19o6); Mayer v. Major, 63
N. Y. 455 (1875).
If one was actually an agent, but dealt as if he were a principal, he will be
liable for money paid to him by mistake, though he had transferred the money
to his undisclosed principal, and he will have to bear the loss. Newall V. Tomlinson, L. R. 6 C. P. 405 (187); Smith v. Kelly, 43 Mich. 390 (i88o). The
principal case is analogous to and in accord with these authorities.
SALEs-LIABILITY FOR IM'URE FOOD-NEGLIGENCE AND NVARRANTY-A

carrier of passengers is not an insurer of the quality of canned goods furnished
on its dining cars, and where the goods served are of a high brand, sold by a reliable
dealer, guaranteed under the Pure Food and 'Drugs Act of June 30, i9o6, and
without defect discoverable to the eye, smell, or taste, the carrier is not liable
for injuries to a passenger eating the goods, which are poisonous. Bigelow v.
Maine Central R. Co., 85 At. Rep. (Me., 1912). This accords with the weight
of authority as shown in Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 N. Y. Misc. 646 (1896);
Rocchi v. Schwabacker, 33 La. Ann. 1364 (188); Copas v. Anglo-Amer. Prov.
Co., 78 Mich. 541 (1889); Farrell v. Manhattan M. Co., 198 Mass. 271, 285 (19o8),
that the liability of the vendor, where he is sought to be charged upon an implied
warranty of wholesomeness, rests upon a knowledge or means of knowledge
open to him, and not open to vendee, e. g. skill in inspecting and observing the
quality of such goods; or where he is sought to be charged for negligence in performing a duty voluntarily assumed, it is a question upon the whole
facts. Bishopv Webber, 139 Mass. 411 (1885); Craft v. Parker, Webb & Co.,
96 Mich. 245 (1893); Hight v. Bacon, 126 Mass. TO (1878); Hoover v. Peters,
18 Mich. 5i (1869); Bohlen, "Cases on Torts," p. 343, n. 2. That a vendor of
food was bound at his peril to know its quality was ruled in Van Branda v.
Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N. Y., 1815), but has been since rigidly modified in Dounce
v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411 (1876); and Burch v. Spence, 22 Hun. 5o9 (N. Y., 1878).
The result of these cases is that in order to establish liability upon the vendor of such goods negligence must be proved, or an express warranty shown.
SALES-TRANSFER OF TITLE-APPROPRIATION OUT OF A HOMOGENEOUS

MAss-A and B agreed that a certain part of cement on hand at B's (the seller's)
warehouse should be separated from the rest and stacked in B's bins at an agreed
price; there was no specific agreement as to the time of delivery. B separated
the cement, placed it in bins marked with A's name and sent A a bill for same,
which A acknowledged receiving and which he promised to pay. The cement
was destroyed while in B's warehouse, but through no fault of B's. Held:
there was prima facie evidence from the separation that title had passed to A.
Moreover, A's promise to remit payment amounted to an acceptance of B's
act as a constructive delivery. Cook v. Bell, 59 S. Rep. 273 (Ala., 1912).
In the court's opinion, it is said that in the case of a contract for the sale
of part of a known and definite mass in the vendor's possession, the whole mass
being of the same kind, quality and value, the agreement becomes an executed
sale and title passes as soon as the vendee's portion is separated from the mass
and identified as such, provided that under the contract, the vendor is to make
selection and the sale is not for cash on delivery. 35 Cyc. pp. 281, 292, 293;
Benjamin on Sales (6th Amer. Ed.) 6o8.
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It is the general rule that property sold out of a mass, and not particularly
identified by marks or peculiarities, must be divided from the bulk, set aside
and specifically appropriated for delivery before title can pass. Haldeman v.
Duncan, 5i Pa. 66 (1865); Lighthouse v. Nat. Bank, 162 N. Y. 336 (C9oo);
Keeler v. Goodwin, iii Mass. 490 (1873). But this doctrine is general only
where the mass is composed of items differing from each other in value, quality,
etc., while alike in kind.
There is, however, a conflict where the mass from which the part sold is
to be taken is indistinguishable and homogeneous (as wine, oil, grain, etc.) and
the vendor and vendee intend title to pass at the time of the sale. The cases
following Kimberly v. Patchin, i9 N. Y. 330 (1859), hold that no division or
separation is necessary to the passing of title to goods sold out of a mass where
the vendor and vendee both intend title to pass, and there is absolutely no distinction between the part sold and the remainder of the bulk, i. e., the mass is
composed of indistinguishable and homogeneous units. Hoffman v. King,
58 Wis. 314 (1883); Conboy v. Petty, 60 IIl. App. 117 (1894); Bank v. Wilder,
34 Minn. 149 (1885).. The weight of authority, however, is that even in such
a case, there must be a separation, and the part sold must be set apart, particularly identified and specifically appropriated before title passes even though
there is a clear intent to the contrary. Popes v. Lane, 9 Allen 502 (Mass.,
1865); Fleming v. State, xo6 Ga. 359 (1898); Jeraulds v. Brown, 64 N. H. 606
(887); Keeler v. Goodwin, iii Mass. 49o (1873).
TORTS-AssIGNABILITY OF ACTIOn-WAsTE-In an action by an assignee
of a leasehold against a tenant, for damages for waste, it was held that the claim
sounded not in covenant, but in tort and was therefore personal and unassignable. De Friet v. Milne, (1913) x Ch. Div. 98.
The case is in accord with the general authorities as to the assignment of
a cause of action ex delicto. A mere right to litigate cannot be assigned. Williams v. Protheroe, 34 N. J. 129 (1829); Dickinson v. Burrell, L. R. i Eq. 342
(1866). But a man can convey his entire interest in property and such interest may include a right of action for injury to that property and thus work
an assignment. Dawson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1905) 1 K. B.
26o; Prosser v. Edmonds, i Y. & C. Ex. 481 (1835); Purple v. Hudson R. R. Co.,
xx N. Y. Super Ct. 74 (1854); but cf. Mallott v. Johnston, io6 Ill, App. 545
(1903). The assignment of a right of action for the asportation of personal
property is valid; North v. Turner, 9 5. & R. 244 (Pa., 1823); or for its conversion, Smith v. Thompson, 94 Mich. 381 (1892); Tyson v. McGuineas, 2 Wis.
656 (1870); contra, Young v. Ferguson, i Litt. 298 (Ky., 1822); or for injury
thereto. McArthur v. Canal Co., 34 Wis. 139 (1874). A common test of assignability is whether the cause of action would pass to the executor upon the
assignor's death. People v. Tioga, 19 Vend. 76 (N. Y., 1837); O'Donnell v.
Seybert, 13 S. & R. 54 (Pa., 1825); Comegys v. Vasse, i Pet. 213 (U. S., 1828).
A bankrupt's right of action for injury to property before bankruptcy rests in
the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70, c. 6. In re Gay, 182 Fed.
260 (1910).

At common law claims for personal injuries were unassignable before verdict. Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377 (ixo5); Weiler v. Jersey City, etc., Ry.
Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 659 (i9o5). But when by statute such claims survive and
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased, such statute is held to render claims for personal injuries assignable. Wells v. Edwards Ry. Co., 50 So.
Rep. 628 (Miss, i909); Lehmann v. Farwell, 95 Wis. x85 (r897); Viment v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa, 513 (1884). But statutes conferring a right of
action upon the widow for the death of her husband, as no cause of action is
made to survive'from the husband, do nqt render the claim assignable before
verdict. Marsh v. West. N. Y. Ry. Co., 204 Pa. 229 (1903). The right of action for injuries to person or personal feelings of bankrupt does not vest in the
trustee in bankruptcy of injured person. In re Haensell, 91 Fed. 355 (1899).
Likewise, claims based upon fraud, unconnected with something having
a legal existence and value, are not assignable. Archer v. Freeman, 124 Cal.
528 (1899); nor are claims based upon conspiracy to defraud. Farwell Co. v.
Wolf, 96 Wis. IO (897).

RECENT CASES
TORTS-LIABILITY OF A CIIARITY-W,here a person was injured through
the negligence of a driver of a team belonging to. and used in the interests of,
the Salvation Army, it was held that x.hough the Salvation Army is a charitable
organization and though it has used due care in the selection of the driver,
nevertheless, it is liable for its servant's negligence.. Basabo v. Salvation Army,
85 Ati. Rep. 120 (R. 1., 1912).
The weight of authority is that a charity is not liable for the torts of its
agents, when those agents were carefully selected. The charity was held not
liable, where a patient in a hospital was injured through negligence of nurse,
in Downes v. Harper Hospital, iot Mich. 555 (1894).
There was no liability
where a patient was injured through unskillful treatment by a surgeon, Mcdonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876); nor where a student
in a laboratory was injured through negligence of a professor, Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 121 Ill. App. 512 (1905); nor where a patient in a hospital was
injured through unskillful and negligent acts of a nurse and a surgeon, Hearns
v. Waterbury He.pital, 66 Conn. 98 (1895); Powers v. Mass. Homeop. Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (i9oI); nor where a boy was injured on the campus of a
university by the negligence of a janitor, Hill v. Univ., 121 Pac. Rep. 9o (Oregon, 1912).
Three reasons are assigned by the courts to support the doctrine of nonliability:
() The inviolable character of trust funds. Downes v. Harper
Hospital, supra; McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, supra; Parks v. Univ.,
supra. (2) Sound public policy, which requires charitable organizations to be
exempt from the rule of respondeat superior. Hearns v. Vaterbury Hospital.
supra. (3) The existence either of an express agreement or of an agreement"
implied from one's acceptance of the benefits of the charity, to hold the corporation harmless for the acts of its servants in administering the charity. Powers v. Mass Hospital, 1o9 Fed. 294 (19oi). This latter reason rests upon an
analogy to the doctrine of assumption of risk in the law of master and servant,
and hence under this analogy would only exempt the charity for torts to the
beneficiaries of the charity and not for torts to outsiders, as in the principal
is
case. Since the decision in Powers v. Mass. Hospital, supra, this reasoning
beginning to be followed in many jurisdictions, as the logical solution of a troublesome question. The principal case refers to it and approves of it, although in
Rhode Island, contrary to the weight of authority, exemption from liability
never has been recognized, Glarin v. R. I. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (1879), save by
statute in the case of hospitals, Laws R. I. (i88o) Ch. 162. It is adopted in
Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214 (N. Y., 19o8), in
which case the theory is discussed and disagreed with. This reason was also
adopted in Bruce v. Central Church, 147 Mich. 230 (1907), where the broad
principle of non-liability, set forth in Downes v. Harper Hospital, ioI Mich.
555 (894), was limited in its application to those who are beneficiaries of a
charitable trust. The universal tendency seems to be to follow the rult in the
principal case; to disregard and disapprove of the first two reasons and to accept
the third as the true basis on which to decide the liability of charitable institutions.
TORTS-LIABILITY

OF

MUNICIPALITIES

FOR MISUSE

OF

STREETs-The

plaintiff's testator died from injuries received from a baseball thrown by one of
a crowd of boys playing on the streets. This custom had been known by the
defendant town for over two years, which made no effort to prevent it. Held,
that the tonn was not liable for injuries arising from the misuse of its streets
by individuals. Goodwin v. Town of Reidsville, 76 S. E. Rep. 232 (N. Car.,
1912).

It is well settled law that a municipality is not liable for torts arising from
breach of its governmental or legislative duties. Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark.
572 (87).
Or of judicial duties. Vaughtman v. Waterloo, 43 N. E. Rep.
476 (Ind., 1896). The corporation is public and sovereign in its nature. Buck.
meyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 (1867). And a statute providing for liability
for injuries from acts or omissions authorizes an action only where the city is
liable in its private and not its public capacity. Wagner v. Portland, 40 Ore.
389 (1902). The city is responsible for the safe keeping of highways, not for
.their lawful use. Jones v. Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722 (1900).
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But negligence in the performance of a ministerialor private duty resulting
in injury is a good ground for an action. Kobs v. Minneapolis, 21 Minn. 159
(875).
But see Gordon v. Omaha, 71 Neb. 570 (1904), holding the city not
responsible to one injured by the failure of its officers to perform a ministerial
duty expressly placed upon them by law, such as the failure to pay an employee his salary. For liability of municipal officers, see 59 U. of P. Law Rev. 197.
And if it is a breach, as in the principal case, it does not matter if it is from
failure to enact such legislation, Tarbutton v. Tennville, xio Ga. 9o (igoo);
Ryan v. Kansas City, 138 S. M. Rep. 566 (Mo., 19it); Marth v. City of Kingfisher, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) t238 (Okla., 19o8), or from the failure to enforce such
ordinance against the unlawful or improper use of the street by persons, vehicles, animals, movable or actually being moved by human will and direction.
For instance, not enforcing an ordinance prohibiting goats running at large,
Pearce v. Lancaster, i Ky. Law Rep. 412 (i88o); dogs, Smith v. Selins Grove,
199 Pa. 615 (i9oi); Addington v. Littleton, 5o Colo. 23 (1911); coasting or
sledding, Wilmington v. Vandergrilt, i Mary. 5 (Del., x893); rope stretched
across street, Barber v. Roxbury, ii Allen 318 (Mass., i865); riding bicycle
on pavement, Rodgers v. Binghamton, 186 N. Y. 595 (19o6); Custer v. New
Philadelphia, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 177 (igoo). But contra, the failure to enforce
was held to give rise to liability in Hagerstown v. Klotz, 93 Md. 437 (1901).
Apparently this is the only jurisdiction at variance with the general rule.
But a municipality may or may not be liable for stationary objects placed
on the highway, according to the circumstances of the case. In Frick v. Kansas
City, 117 Mo. APP. 488 (io6), it was held liable for erection of private nuisance
onhighway; but held not liable in Wolff v. District of Columbia, 196 U. S. 152
TORTS-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF AMUSEMENT PARK FOR NEGLIGENCC OF
CONCESSIONARY-An amusement belonging to concessionaries of an amuse-

ment park stood on land leased from a third party, but with its entrance on
land within the limits of the park. The owner of the park was held liable for
injuries to a woman hurt on the land of the third party, because of his reserving
the right to superintend the buildings and appliances of his concessionaries; the
court holding him as virtual lessor of the land. Babicz v. Riverview Sharpshooter Park Co., 99 N. E. Rep. 86o (I1., 1912).
The case is interesting largely because of its unusual facts. The duty of
the owner of an amusement park to take reasonable care of those who come
upon his grounds is undoubted and the great weight of authority holds him liable
for injury caused by the negligence of a concessionary. Thornton v. Maine
State Agri. Soc., 53 At. Rep. 979 (Me., 1902), where the plaintiff was killed
while standing on a station platform outside the grounds, by a stray shot from
a shooting gallery. The liability seems to be the consequence of the right of
oversight of the owner of the park to regulate the amusements offered by the
concessionaries. In Rayfield v. Sans Souci Park, I47 Mo. App. 493 (1910),
where a concessionary had exclusive possession and control of the particular
portion of the park rented, the owner was held not liable for injuries caused by
the concessionary's negligence. In the case where the owner of a park employs an independent contractor to give an exhibition there is a split of jurisdictions. In Richmond & M. R. Co. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493 (1898), the owner
of the park was held liable for the death of a boy killed by a pole used to support
a balloon while being inflated. This would seem the weight of authority, but
see contra, Smith v. Berwick, 41 At. Rep. 56 (Md., 1898). The owner, however, is never an insurer of those who come upon his premises. Higgins v.
Franklin Co. Agri. Soc., 62 At. Rep. 708 (Me., i9o5).
ToRTs-TRESPASSERS

ON

HiGHwAY-UNREGISTERED

AUToMoBnEs-An

automobile, not registered as required by the Act of April 27, igog, P. L. 265,
is a trespasser on the highway and in case of collision with a trolley car, the
owner of it can not recover in absence of proof that the trolley company was.
guilty of gross negligence or willful reckleness. Bortner v. York Rwy. Co., 22
Pa. Dist. Rep. 84 (1913).

RECENT CASES
To support this strange decision the trial court was forced to rely upon
Massachusetts authorities, starting with Dudley v. RwAy. Co., 89 N. E. Rep.
25 (Mass., I9io), where, under a similar statute the same conclusion was reached,
the court holding that "the legislature intended to outlaw unregistered machines" and give them no more rights than to willfull trespassers. And the same
is true of guests who are ignorant that the machine is not registered, Freely v. City
of Melrose, 91 N. E. Rep. 3n6 (Mass., i91o), and are not protected under an
"Act to provide for the better protection of travelers at railroad crossings."
Chase v. N. Y. R. R., 94 N. E. Rep. 377 (Mass., 19i). However, the basis
of these cases seems to be the old puritanical thought, that the breaker of a
law is without reasonable protection. Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansee, lo
Met. 363 (Mass., x845), where it was held contributory negligence to drive on
Sunday contrary to law.
But the general law is that the mere fact that the plaintiff was breaking
a law at the time he was injured will not of itself bar a recovery. Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. i99 (1870); Brescharton v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. I (i89o); Hughes v.
Steel Co., 36 L. N. S. 547 (Ga., 1911) ani note, as to breaches of an ordinance;
nor even in case of the breach of a statute. Minerly v. Ferry Co., 56 Hun. 113
(N. Y., 1887). There is a distinction between an act contributing to the accident
and contributory negligence. It may be a condition, but is not the cause.
Magar v. Hammond, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 532 (19oo).
To this general rule the Pennsylvania courts have always adhered, and
Mahoney v. Clark, 26 Pa. 342
never hold the breaker of a law "an outlaw."
(1885). Where a plaintiff placed his wares on pavement in violation of an ordinance, the court said "even if the defendant in error (pl.) did violate an ordinance of the city, that violation was not the proximate cause." Gannon v.
Wilson, i8 Wkly Notes of Cases 7 (Pa., 1886). Nor did he have to prove wilful
recklessness or gross negligence. In Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, 191 Pa.
345, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for defendant's negligence, although
the plaintiff at the time was breaking an ordinance. Mr. Chief Justice Fell
said: "We do not think the fact that the plaintiff was running his carat a higher
rate of speed than eight miles an hour affects his right to recover. It may be
that in so doing he violated the ordinance by virtue of which the company was
permitted to operate its cars on the streets of the borough, but he certainly was not
for that reason without right upon the street."
For the rule contra to the principal case, see Atlantic Coast Linev. Weir, 58
So. Rep. 641 (Fla., 1912) semble. But also, Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. Rep.
376 (Del., i9io), where breach of such a statute by the defendant was negligence
per Se.
TRESPASS Q. C. F.-PERSON ENTITLED TO SUE-_A, tenant for years sublet
part of the premises, in violation of a covenant not to sublet. In an action of"
trespass q. c. f. against the subtenant by the lessor, it was held that there was not
in fact such actual possession in the lessor as is necessary in order to maintain
trespass q. c. f., and that the subtenant was not a trespasser. Linn Woolen
Co. v. Brown, 85 At. Rep. 404 (Me., 1912).
The gist of the action is the injury to the possessory right. t Chitty, Pleading (6th Ed.) 175; Perry v. Bailey, 94 Me. 50 (19oo). Possession, not right of
property, is the criterion. Greber v. Kleckner, 2 Pa. 289 (1845). The plaintiff
must have either actual or constructive possession. Gould v. Steinburg, 4 11.
App. 439 (1879). Unoccupied lands are in the constructive possession of the
title holder. Tustin v. Sammons, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 175 (1903); Parsons v.
Dickinson, 28 Mass. 352 (1831). But occupation without right or title is insufficient. Mulberry v. Carrier, I8 Pa. Super. Ct. 5i (IgoI).
A landlord cannot maintain trespass q. c. f. after having parted with his
entire possession to a lessee. Holmes v. Seely, x9 Wend. 507 (N. Y., 1838);
Torrence v. Irwin, 2 Yeates 210 (Pa., 1797); except against a wrongdoer who
does permanent injury to the freehold during a tenancy at will, Starr v. Jackson, ii Mass. 518 (1814); Curtiss v. Hoyt, i9 Conn. 168 (1848); or during a
tenancy for years. Perry v. Bailey, supra. The landlord may also bring trespass against a tenant at will who commits waste. Chambers v. Smith, 152 Mass.
56i (189o); Perry v. Carr, 44 N. H. 118 (1862); contra, Young v. Young, 36 Me.

348

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

But where, to terminate a tenancy at will, notice is required by
statute, Woodman v. Francis, 96 Mass. t98 (1867), or by common law, Clark
v. Smith, 25 Pa. 137 (z855); Gunsolus v. l.ormer, 54 Wis. 63o (1882), the tenant at will, and not the latidlord, must bring the action.
In the case of land dedicated to the public, the owner of the fee can maintain trespass q. c. f. Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, L. R. (1893) x Q. B. D. 142;
Peck v. Smith, i Conn. 103 (1814); Hollenbeck v. Rowley, 9o Mass. 473 (x864).
133 (1853).

